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Formalism and Employer Liability under
Title VII
Samuel R. Bagenstost
INTRODUCTION
Most lawyers, law professors, and judges are familiar with
two standard critiques of formalism in legal reasoning. One is
the unacknowledged-policymaking critique. This critique argues
that formalist reasoning purports to be above judicial
policymaking but instead simply hides the policy decisions
offstage.1  The other is the false-determinacy critique. This
critique observes that formalist reasoning purports to reduce
decision costs in the run of cases by sorting cases into defined
categories, but argues that instead of going away the difficult
questions of application migrate to the choice of the category in
which to place a particular case. 2
Last term's decision in Vance v Ball State University 3
demonstrates that the Supreme Court's complex doctrine on
employer liability under Title VII amply deserves each of these
critiques. The Court's formalistic reasoning conceals a series of
unacknowledged, undefended, and dubious policy choices. Those
choices stand behind the Court's resolution of the question that
triggered substantial debate within the Court-how to define a
"supervisor," whose harassing acts trigger employer liability.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to the editors of the
University of Chicago Legal Forum for inviting me to contribute to its symposium on the
Civil Rights Act at 50 Years, and to the participants at that symposium for stimulating
comments and conversation. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the Eighth
Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law; thanks to
the participants at that colloquium for their very helpful feedback.
1 One could find hundreds of citations illustrating this critique, but it is present at
least as early as Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 Colum L Rev 809, 847-49 (1935).
2 For a recent example of the false-determinacy critique, see generally Joseph
William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 UC Davis L Rev 1369 (2013).
133 S Ct 2434 (2013).
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They also stand behind the perhaps more important holding,
hiding in plain sight, that an employer is liable for harassment
by nonsupervisory coworkers only when the employer is itself
negligent. To the extent that the Court offered any justification
for its decision, that justification was one of crispness and
determinacy of application. But, as is often the case with
formalist reasoning, the Court's promises of crispness and
determinacy were almost transparently false.
In her dissenting opinion in Vance, Justice Ginsburg urged
Congress to overturn the Court's narrow interpretation of who is
a "supervisor."4 Such an action would solve some of the problems
with the Court's opinion, but it would not go far enough. Rather,
Congress should reconsider the entire employer liability
structure the Court constructed in the landmark 1998 Faragher
and Ellerth cases.5 Congress might change that structure in a
number of ways. The best approach, I argue, would be to declare
employers liable whenever any of their employees engages in
discriminatory harassment in violation of Title VII. Such a
regime would not distinguish between harassment committed by
supervisors and that committed by coworkers. Nor would it give
employers the affirmative defense created by Faragher and
Ellerth. A clean, certain rule of vicarious employer liability
serves the key policies underlying Title VII, and it does so far
better than do the alternatives.
My argument proceeds as follows. Parts I and II discuss the
Vance case itself. Part I elaborates the unacknowledged-
policymaking critique. Part II elaborates the false- determinacy
critique. I then turn, in Part III, to the question of how Congress
should respond. My goal in this essay is therefore both to
elaborate a critique of the current law and to channel the
reformist energy unleashed by Vance into a more thoroughgoing
direction than Justice Ginsburg's dissent suggests.
I. THE UNACKNOWLEDGED POLICY CHOICES
The Court granted certiorari in Vance to resolve a conflict in
the circuits regarding who counts as a supervisor for purposes of
4 See id at 2466 (Ginsburg dissenting).
See generally Faragher u City of Boca Raton, 524 US 775 (1998); Burlington
Industries, Inc u Ellerth, 524 US 742 (1998).
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its Title VII employer liability doctrine.6 In its landmark 1998
decisions in Faragher v City of Boca Raton7 and Burlington
Industries, Inc v Ellerth,8 the Court made supervisory status a
trigger for a form of vicarious employer liability. If a supervisor
committed discriminatory harassment, the Court held, the
employer would be at least presumptively liable.9 Where the
supervisor accomplished the harassment through a "tangible
employment action"-"a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing
a significant change in benefits"-the employer would be
absolutely liable.10 Where the harassment did not include such
an action, the Court held, the employer would still be
presumptively liable but would be entitled to establish, as an
affirmative defense, that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and that
the employee-plaintiff "unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.""
In adopting a narrow understanding of who counts as a
supervisor, the Vance Court purported to ask what definition
"best fits within the highly structured framework that [Faragher
and Ellerth] adopted." 12 But any number of ways of defining a
supervisor might have fit within the framework of Faragher and
Ellerth. To decide which of those definitions to adopt required
consideration of why the Court adopted the framework and what
definition best fit those reasons. The Court's resolution of the
definitional question is inconsistent with what I shall argue is
the most attractive understanding of the reasons the Court
adopted the FaragherlEllerth framework. I discuss these points
in Section A.
But the Court's decision rested on an even more
significant-and even more suppressed-policy judgment. That
judgment is the determination that employers cannot be liable
6 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2443.
524 US 775 (1998).
" 524 US 742 (1998).
9 See Faragher, 524 US at 807; Ellerth, 524 US at 765.
10 Ellerth, 524 US at 761.
1 Id at 765. See also Faragher, 524 US at 807.
12 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2446.
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for harassment undertaken by nonsupervisory coworkers unless
the employers are themselves negligent. 13 In Faragher and
Ellerth, the Court had assumed that a negligence standard
applied in such circumstances, but it never held as much-and it
certainly never sought to justify such a holding. In Pennsylvania
State Police v Suders,14 decided six years after Faragher and
Ellerth, the Court reiterated that it had not decided what
standard of employer liability is appropriate in coworker
harassment cases.15 Vance must be read as holding for the first
time-without announcing the innovation-that negligence is
the standard. Yet the Vance Court never once sought to justify
adopting such a standard, and the arguments against a
negligence rule are much stronger than the arguments for one. I
discuss these points in Section B.
A. Defining Supervisor
1. The Vance Court's formalist approach.
When the Court granted certiorari in Vance, lower courts
had adopted two distinct approaches for determining who
constitutes a supervisor under Title VII. Some courts had
defined a supervisor to embrace anyone who had been delegated
authority by the employer "to exercise significant direction over
[the plaintiff's] daily work." 16 Other courts, including the
Seventh Circuit in Vance itself, had held that a supervisor must
have "the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or
discipline the victim"-in other words, the power to carry out a
"tangible employment action."17
As Justice Alito's opinion for the Court correctly noted, the
plain meaning of the word "supervisor" could not resolve that
" What it means for an employer that is not a natural person, but that can act only
through human agents, to itself be negligent is not an easy question, though the Court
has shown no sign of appreciating the point. I discuss this issue in Part II.
14 542 US 129 (2004).
15 See id at 143 n 6 ("Ellerth and Faragher expressed no view on the employer
liability standard for co-worker harassment. Nor do we.").
16 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2443. For examples of lower courts that followed this
approach, see Whitten u Fred's, Inc, 601 F3d 231, 245-47 (4th Cir 2010); Mack v Otis
Elevator Co, 326 F3d 116, 126-27 (2d Cir 2003).
17 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2443. For examples of other lower court decisions, see Noviello
u Boston, 398 F3d 76, 96 (1st Cir 2005); Weyers u Lear Operations Corp, 359 F3d 1049,
1057 (8th Cir 2004) (all concluding that, to be a supervisor, one must have the ability to
take a "tangible employment action").
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disagreement.1 8 "Supervisor," after all, is a term with broader
and narrower meanings. In ordinary usage and in the law, the
term sometimes embraces any individual who has day-to-day
authority to direct a subordinate's work, but it sometimes
embraces only those individuals who have hiring and firing
authority.19 Moreover, as Justice Alito also correctly noted, it
makes little sense to parse the word "supervisor" "as if [it] were
a statutory term."2 0 Congress did not use that word; the Court in
Faragher and Ellerth came up with it "as a label for the class of
employees whose misconduct may give rise to vicarious
employer liability."21
So far, so good. Having established that the proper
definition of "supervisor" cannot come simply from textual
formalism, the sensible next step for the Court would have been
to look behind the label and ask, based on the statutory policies
that animated Faragher and Ellerth, precisely what is the "class
of employees whose misconduct may give rise to vicarious
employer liability." If supervisory status distinguishes those
employees from the other employees whose misconduct does not
trigger vicarious liability, we might ask what it is about
supervisory status that makes employer liability appropriate.
We might then use that justification as a guide to defining the
category of supervisor. Rather standard, perfectly appropriate
legal reasoning.
But that is precisely the road the Vance Court did not take.
Having rejected formalism of the text as unhelpful and
inapposite, the Court sought solace in a different formalism-
the formalism of the "framework." Rather than looking to what
definition of the category best fits the reasons why Faragher and
Ellerth held that employers are liable for the acts of their
supervisors, the Court concluded that "the way to understand
the meaning of the term 'supervisor' for present purposes is to
consider the interpretation that best fits within the highly
structured framework that those cases adopted." 2 2 And the
18 See Vance, 133 S Ct at 2444.
19 See id at 2444-46. See also Catherine L. Fisk, Supervisors in a World of Flat
Hierarchies, 64 Hastings L J 1403, 1408-13 (2013) (discussing the differences of opinion
regarding the definition of supervisor under the National Labor Relations Act).
20 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2446.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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Court found it "implicit in the characteristics of [that]
framework" that an individual cannot be a supervisor unless she
has authority to take a "tangible employment action." 2 3 The
implication, the Court suggested, appeared in Ellerth's
statement that:
Tangible employment actions fall within the special
province of the supervisor. The supervisor has been
empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent to
make economic decisions affecting other employees under
his or her control. . . . Tangible employment actions are
the means by which the supervisor brings the official
power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates. 24
"The strong implication of this passage," the Vance Court
concluded, "is that the authority to take tangible employment
actions is the defining characteristic of a supervisor." 2 5
That reading of Faragher and Ellerth is a stretch. In the
passage quoted by the Vance Court, Ellerth was explaining why
tangible employment actions should trigger liability without any
possibility that the employer could make out an affirmative
defense. "When a supervisor makes a tangible employment
decision," the Ellerth Court explained just before the passage
quoted in Vance, "there is assurance the injury could not have
been inflicted absent the agency relation."26 But to say that we
can be certain that the supervisor is aided by the agency relation
when she undertakes a tangible employment action does not at
all imply that a supervisor is not aided by the agency relation
when she fails to undertake-or even lacks power to
undertake-such an action. It is a completely sensible
interpretation of the FaragherlEllerth framework to say that we
make employers automatically liable, with no affirmative
defense, when discriminatory harassment results in a tangible
employment action, but that we make employers liable for
harassment by day-to-day supervisors who lack hiring and firing
authority subject to the affirmative defense. Even when a
harassing supervisor lacks hiring and firing authority, we can
23 Id at 2448.
24 See Vance, 133 S Ct at 2448, quoting Ellerth, 524 US at 762 (emphasis in Vance).
25 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2448.
26 Ellerth, 524 US at 761-62.
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conclude that the harassment will often, though not always,
have been aided by the agency relation, and we can rely on the
affirmative defense to appropriately sort the cases. As far as the
FaragherlEllerth framework goes, both the more employer-
friendly reading adopted by the Vance Court and the more
employee-friendly reading offered by the plaintiff would have fit.
The definition of supervisor the Court adopted in Vance
thus was not dictated by statutory text or prior precedent. In
choosing between a narrow and a broad definition, the Court
was forced to make a policy decision regarding the extent to
which employers should be responsible for the harassing acts of
those employees they put in a position to direct other employees'
work. But the Court did not acknowledge this policy question,
much less seek to defend the choice it made.
2. The contrast with Faragher.
The Court's mode of proceeding in Vance contrasts sharply
with its approach in Faragher. Although some commentators
have criticized Faragher as itself driven by a wooden and
formalistic analysis, 27 that decision contains a reasonably open
and candid discussion of the policy choices the Court was called
upon to make. Following the Court's prior statement that
Congress intended courts to look to common-law agency
principles as a starting point for deciding the scope of employer
liability under Title V11 28-a statement it believed to be
confirmed by Congress's failure to alter the rules for employer
liability in the Civil Rights Act of 199129-the Faragher Court
recognized that Congress required it to craft a liability scheme
that implemented these principles while serving the statute's
underlying policies. 30 The Faragher Court focused its analysis on
the principle set forth in Section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency that an employer is liable for torts of an
27 See Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies:
Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J
755, 767-73 (1999); Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title
VII A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 San Diego L Rev 41, 49 (1999).
See also Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form
Ouer Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 Harv Women's L J 3, 11-12 (2003)
(describing the formalism of lower courts' interpretation of Faragher and Ellerth).
28 See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB u Vinson, 477 US 57, 72 (1986).
29 See Faragher, 524 US at 792.
so See id at 802 n 3, 805-07.
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employee who was "aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation."31
In determining that supervisors who harass are generally
aided by the existence of their relationship with the employer,
the Court focused on two salient points. First, the "agency
relationship affords contact with an employee subjected to a
supervisor's [discriminatory] harassment."32 But that alone, the
Ellerth Court explained the same day, would not be enough for
employer liability. 33 Second, and crucially, a supervisor's power
to retaliate against employees who complain about harassment
may well make the victim "reluctant to accept the risks of
blowing the whistle on a superior":
When a person with supervisory authority discriminates
in the terms and conditions of subordinates' employment,
his actions necessarily draw upon his superior position
over the people who report to him, or those under them,
whereas an employee generally cannot check a
supervisor's abusive conduct the same way that she
might deal with abuse from a co-worker. 34
The Ellerth Court similarly observed that "a supervisor s power
and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a
particular threatening character, and in this sense, a supervisor
always is aided by the agency relation."35
The Faragher and Ellerth Court did not stop simply by
noting the ways in which a supervisor's conduct generally
draws, if only implicitly, on the agency relation with the
employer. The Court in those cases believed that it could not
pursue that argument to its logical limit, and make employers
vicariously liable for all of the harassing conduct committed by
their supervisors, for three reasons. First, the Court pointed to
its earlier statement in Mertor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson 36
that employers are not "always automatically liable for sexual
s Faragher, 524 US at 801-08, citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d)
(1958). Note that the current Restatement no longer includes this language. See Vance,
133 S Ct at 2441 n 2.
32 Faragher, 524 US at 803.
" See Ellerth, 524 US at 760.
34 Faragher, 524 US at 803.
" Ellerth, 524 US at 763.
1 477 US 57 (1986).
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harassment by their supervisors." 37 This statement, Faragher
and Ellerth concluded, was a holding-and one with strong stare
decisis effect because Congress left it intact while making other
changes to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.38 Second,
Ellerth explained that "there may be some circumstances where
the supervisor's status makes little difference" to her
accomplishment of the harassment. 39 Finally, both Faragher and
Ellerth emphasized that the Court must take account of what it
called "the statutory policy" of preventing, rather than simply
compensating for, discrimination, as well as the "equally obvious
policy" of encouraging victims of discrimination to mitigate
damages. 40 The Court's ultimate holding regarding the
standards for employer liability reflected an unabashed
balancing of these different policy considerations, as the Court
made clear in the paragraph that it repeated verbatim in both
Faragher and Ellerth.4 1
7 See id at 72.
"' See Faragher, 524 US at 804 n 4.
39 Ellerth, 524 US at 763.
40 Faragher, 524 US at 806. See also Ellerth, 524 US at 764.
41 The paragraph reads:
In order to accommodate the agency principles of vicarious liability for harm
caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII's equally basic
policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by
objecting employees, we adopt the following holding .... An employer is
subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher)
authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages,
subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
8(c). The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had
promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy
suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in
any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that
an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to
avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any
complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure
will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element
of the defense. No affirmative defense is available, however, when the
supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as
discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.
Faragher, 524 US at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 US at 764-65.
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3. The Vance Court's hidden policy choices.
How might the Vance Court have addressed the question of
defining a supervisor consistent with the mode of analysis in
Faragher and Ellerth? In keeping with Faragher and Ellerth's
conclusion that harassment by supervisors is often aided by the
agency relation because its victims fear retaliation, the Court
might have asked, as an empirical matter, what are the acts a
supervisory employee could take that would make a threat of
retaliation effective. Alternatively, the Court might have asked
whether a particular definition of supervisor would serve or
disserve the statutory policies of prevention and encouraging
victims to mitigate damages.
But the Vance Court did not engage any of these questions.
The Court did assert, in a single sentence, that "[i]t is because a
supervisor has th[e] authority ["to inflict direct economic
injury"]-and its potential use hangs as a threat over the
victim-that vicarious liability (subject to the affirmative
defense) is justified."42 There can be no doubt that the power to
inflict direct economic injury is one mode by which a superior
employee can retaliate against an individual who complains
about harassment. The Faragher Court itself pointed to the
power "to hire and fire" as one of the characteristics that makes
it difficult for a worker to "check a supervisor's abusive conduct
the same way that she might deal with abuse from a co-
worker." 43 But Faragher also referred to the authority "to set
work schedules" as one of the means by which a supervisor
might effectively retaliate.44
And the Court's own Title VII retaliation cases have
recognized that employers can effectively deter complaints about
discrimination even if they take actions that fall well short of
tangible employment actions. In Burlington Northern v White,45
the Court expressly rejected any limitation of Title VII's anti-
retaliation provisions "to so-called 'ultimate employment
decisions."'4 6 Rather, the Court recognized that a broader array
42 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2448.
43 Faragher, 524 US at 803, quoting Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 Stan L Rev 813,
854 (1991).
44 Faragher, 524 US at 803, quoting Estrich, 43 Stan L Rev at 854 (cited in note 43).
4' 548 US 53 (2006).
46 Id at 67.
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of employment actions-including schedule changes, exclusion
from training lunches, and the like-will deter employees from
complaining about discrimination. 4 7 The Burlington Northern
Court specifically held that a "reassignment of duties" can
constitute retaliation even where "both the former and present
duties fall within the same job description." 4 8 Because "[a]lmost
every job category involves some responsibilities that are less
desirable than others," the Court explained, "one good way to
discourage an employee . . . from bringing discrimination
charges would be to insist that she spend more time performing
the more arduous duties." 4 9
The Vance Court did not engage with, much less dispute,
this point.50 And the Court could hardly have denied that the
power of a superior employee to make day-to-day assignments of
work can effectively deter the victim of harassment from
complaining. The Court's ruling can best be defended as resting
on the implicit conclusion that the cost of employer liability for
harassment committed by employees who lack the power to hire
and fire outweighs the additional protection that employer
liability would give those victims who are deterred from
complaining by a superior employee's ability to make work
assignments. But the Court never even acknowledged, much less
sought to justify, that choice.
The Court's implicit policy choice was a dubious one at best.
Extensive sociological and psychological evidence demonstrates
that people who complain about harassment and discrimination
provoke "widespread dislike" and "pervasive[] ... retaliation"
within their workplaces. 51 This dislike and retaliation is a key
deterrent that keeps individuals from taking action to stop
discrimination and harassment perpetrated against them.52 The
evidence does not suggest that the likelihood or effectiveness of
retaliation depends on the formal job duties of the harasser.
Rather, as Deborah Brake shows in her review of the literature,
47 See id at 69.
48 Id at 70.
49 Burlington Northern, 548 US at 70-71.
'o It is notable that Justice Alito, who wrote the Court's opinion in Vance, rejected
the Court's analysis in Burlington Northern. See Burlington Northern, 548 US at 73
(Alito concurring in the judgment).
" See Deborah L. Brake and Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VI as a
Rights-Claiming System, 86 NC L Rev 859, 902-03 (2008).
12 See id at 904.
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the likelihood and effectiveness of retaliation depends much
more on the relative status of the perpetrator and the target
within an institution. 53 Because designation as a supervisor is
one index of higher status within an organization, targets of
harassment perpetrated by individuals who are so designated
can legitimately fear retaliation, regardless of whether the
supervisors have the power to take "tangible employment
actions" as defined in Faragher and Ellerth. As I argue below,
the same sociological and psychological evidence suggests that
the Court should not draw a firm line between supervisors and
coworkers for purposes of triggering employer liability. But even
assuming such a line makes sense, there are substantial reasons
to doubt that the line should be drawn at the place where an
individual has the power to take a tangible employment action.54
B. Making Negligence the Baseline Rule
1. The hiding-in-plain-sight holding.
There is even a more significant aspect to the Vance
holding. That is the Court's conclusion that an employer is liable
for the discriminatory harassment of nonsupervisory employees
only if the employer is itself negligent. This aspect of the holding
was a bit hidden, because it was not the basis for the
disagreement between the majority and the dissent. But it was
hiding in plain sight. There can be no doubt after Vance that
employers are liable for harassment perpetrated by
nonsupervisory workers only if the employers themselves are
negligent. As the Vance Court squarely stated, "[n]egligence
provides the better framework for evaluating an employer's
liability when a harassing employee lacks the power to take
tangible employment actions."5 5 But the Court made no effort to
justify this aspect of its holding-in Vance or in any of its earlier
cases-and the arguments for it are weak.
In its pre-Vance cases, the Court never held that a
negligence standard of employer liability applied to coworker-on-
coworker harassment. Faragher, to be sure, seemed to assume
that a negligence standard applied in such circumstances. In
" See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn L Rev 18, 40-42 (2005).
14 See Vance, 133 S Ct at 2454-66 (Ginsburg dissenting).
55 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2448.
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holding that supervisors who harass are not always acting in the
scope of their employment, the Faragher Court pointed to the
"uniform[]" view of lower courts that "co-worker harassment"
was to be judged under a "negligence standard."56 The Court
found it "quite unlikely that these cases would escape efforts to
render them obsolete if we were to hold that supervisors who
engage in discriminatory harassment are necessarily acting
within the scope of their employment."5 7 But the Faragher Court
offered no affirmative argument that coworker harassment
should be assessed under a negligence standard.5 8 Any such
argument would have been dicta in any event. Faragher, like
Ellerth, was a case involving harassment by a supervisor, not a
coworker, so the standard of employer liability for coworker
harassment was not squarely presented. And in its only
discussion of the issue between FaragherlEllerth and Vance, the
Court expressly stated that the standard for coworker
harassment remained an open question: "Ellerth and Faragher
expressed no view on the employer liability standard for co-
worker harassment. Nor do we."5 9
Although the Court had at best assumed that a negligence
standard applies to coworker harassment-and had never
offered a substantive defense of that proposition-the Vance
Court treated negligence as the undisputed baseline rule for
employer liability. Thus, Vance began its discussion of employer
liability standards by stating that "we have held that an
employer is directly liable for an employee's unlawful
harassment if the employer was negligent with respect to the
offensive behavior," but that Faragher and Ellerth "held that
different rules apply where the harassing employee is the
plaintiff's 'supervisor."'60 And it later referred to Faragher and
1 Faragher, 524 US at 799.
1 Id at 800.
"' See Fisk and Chemerinsky, 7 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 769 (cited in note 27). See
also Harper, 36 San Diego L Rev at 53 (cited in note 27).
'9 Suders, 542 US at 143 n 6.
60 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2441 (emphasis added). To support its statement that the
Court had "held" that negligence is the baseline standard, the Vance Court cited page
789 of the Faragher opinion. See id. But on that page, Faragher does nothing more than
discuss the lower court decisions applying a negligence standard. See Faragher, 524 US
at 789. Although the Faragher Court may have assumed that those decisions were
correct, it never held as much.
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Ellerth as having "created a special rule for cases involving
harassment by 'supervisors."' 61
That is simply an incorrect statement of what Faragher and
Ellerth held. As I have shown, those cases did not hold that
negligence is the baseline standard for employer liability under
Title VII, but that "special rules" apply where supervisors do the
discriminating. Because those cases involved discrimination
undertaken by people who were concededly supervisors, the
question of employer liability for nonsupervisors' conduct was
simply not presented. All the Court decided was that, where
supervisors are the harassers, the employer is vicariously liable
(subject to an affirmative defense in the absence of a tangible
employment action). Although the Court may have assumed that
negligence was the standard in other contexts, it had never held
as much-as the Court itself noted in Suders.62
2. The hidden policy choices.
Vance thus marks the first time the Court held that a
negligence standard applies to discriminatory harassment
committed by a nonsupervisory coworker. One would think that
the Court would have felt the need to offer some substantive
defense of the negligence standard in terms of the policies that
underlie Title VII. But Vance offered no such defense. To be
sure, the Court sought to parry Justice Ginsburg's suggestion in
dissent that negligence leaves victims of harassment without a
remedy 63-a parry that, as I discuss below, was not especially
persuasive-but the Court made absolutely no effort to show
that a negligence standard best serves the statutory policies and
purposes.
Any such effort would have been extremely challenging, for
at least two reasons. First, most of the policy rationales offered
by the Faragher and Ellerth Courts for employer liability for
supervisors' actions (subject to the affirmative defense) suggest
that employer liability is appropriate on the same terms for
coworkers' actions. As Professor Harper argued shortly after
Faragher and Ellerth, "[t]he prevention-based cost
internalization [argument], as well as the remediation
61 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2442 (emphasis added).
62 See Suders 542 US at 143 n 6.
6 See Vance, 133 S Ct at 2453; id at 2463 (Ginsburg dissenting).
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arguments for employer liability for co-worker discriminatory
harassment, are as strong as those for employer liability for
supervisory harassment."64
The Faragher Court, to be sure, noted two distinctions
between supervisors and other employees that seem relevant
here-notably "that supervisors have special authority
enhancing their ability to harass, and that the employer can
guard against their misbehavior more easily because their
numbers are by definition fewer than the numbers of regular
employees." 65 But there is less to these distinctions than initially
appears. The suggestion that supervisors' conduct is generally
easier for employers to monitor is empirically dubious, as many
supervisors will have greater opportunities than other
coworkers to commit harassing acts out of the sight of
witnesses.66 The other possible distinction is stronger but not, I
think, sufficient. Supervisors do have special power to harass,
because of their ability to threaten retaliation. But the
difference between supervisors and ordinary employees in this
regard is one of degree rather than kind. As Professor Harper
noted, there are many circumstances in which the victim of
harassment will rationally fear retaliation for reporting the
violation even when the perpetrator is not a supervisor. 67 The
harasser may be a top income producer for the employer, for
example, or otherwise have higher status in the company than
does the victim. 68 As Professor Brake's work demonstrates, these
kinds of status differences, and not the formal lines of authority,
are likely to be key in promoting retaliation. 69
Alternatively, the victim may simply fear that an employer
that has not implemented an effective policy against harassment
64 Harper, 36 San Diego L Rev at 82 (cited in note 27). See also Fisk and
Chemerinsky, 7 Wm Mary Bill Rts J at 757 (cited in note 27) (arguing that strict
vicarious liability "advances the goals of the civil rights laws" by promoting deterrence
and compensation). For further discussion of the policy question of what rule of employer
liability makes sense, see Part III below.
6 Faragher, 524 US at 800-01.
6 See Harper, 36 San Diego L Rev at 83 n 155 (cited in note 27).
6 See id at 83-84.
68 This may be true for third-party or customer harassment as well. See, for
example, Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart
v Dukes, 32 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 477, 505 (2011) (describing testimony in one
case against a drug company "regarding a firm culture that permitted and tolerated
sexual advances by doctors on the female sales representatives").
69 See Brake, 90 Minn L Rev at 40-41 (cited in note 53).
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will respond negatively to complaints regarding the
discrimination it has tolerated. If, as Professor Schultz argues,
much harassment aims to enforce pre-existing workplace norms
of segregation,70 this fear will be particularly rational.71 And as
for the other policies identified by Faragher-prioritizing
prevention over compensation, and encouraging victims to
mitigate damages-vicarious liability plus the affirmative
defense serves these policies just as well in the coworker context
as in the supervisor context.
Second, contrary to the Court's protestations, a negligence
standard will leave many employees without a remedy when
their coworkers harass them in ways that violate Title VII. One
wonders why the Court even protested. After all, the whole point
of adopting a negligence standard instead of a standard of strict
liability is to limit the circumstances in which employers will be
liable for the wrongful actions of their employees. 72 And, under
Title VII, employers are the only potential defendants in town. 73
If the victims of discriminatory harassment cannot recover from
their employers, they cannot recover at all for a violation of their
rights under Title VII. Moreover, there is a substantial and
unresolved question whether the victim of discriminatory
harassment could recover damages in any event, even if she
could prove that her employer was negligent. The Civil Rights
Act of 1991, which authorized the award of damages for
violations of Title VII, limits such awards to cases "against a
respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination."7 4 Although discriminatory harassment is a form
of intentional discrimination, 75 the respondent in Title VII cases
70 See generally Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L J
1683, 1756-61 (1998). See also Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual
Harassment Law, 13 Geo Mason L Rev 817, 838-41 (2005) (reviewing evidence
demonstrating that the predictors of harassment are organizational, rather than
individual, in nature).
71 See Brake, 90 Minn L Rev at 41-42 (cited in note 53) (explaining that retaliation
is particularly prevalent in workplaces "with a high tolerance for, and incidence of,
discrimination").
72 This is not to deny that there might be good reasons for limiting employer
liability-though the Vance Court did not offer any-but it is simply to say that the
inevitable result of a rule limiting employer liability is less employer liability.
7 See Fisk and Chemerinsky, 7 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 763-64 (cited in note 27)
(collecting cases).
74 42 USC § 1981a(a)(1).
7 See, for example, Oncale u Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc, 523 US 75, 78-80
(1998).
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is the employer. Where the employer is vicariously liable for an
employee's discrimination (as in Faragher), it seems to follow
that the discriminating employee's intent should be imputed to
the employer, and that the victim can therefore recover
damages. But where the employer is liable directly for its own
negligence-whatever "its own negligence" means-the
argument that the employer itself "engaged" in intentional
discrimination (as required for a damages remedy under the
Civil Rights Act of 199176) seems much more problematic. 77
Victims of coworker harassment thus may be limited-even if
they can prove employer negligence-to declaratory and
injunctive relief and backpay only in cases of actual or
constructive discharge.78 The Vance Court's protests that
negligence does not leave employees without a remedy thus
seem doubly flawed.
The discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 suggests a
third possible problem with the adoption of a negligence
standard: holding an employer liable for its own negligence fits
uneasily with the formal structure the Supreme Court has
erected for Title VII claims. The Court has created two distinct
frameworks for bringing and adjudicating race and sex
discrimination claims under the statute: disparate treatment
and disparate impact.79 A disparate treatment claim requires
7 Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (2000), codified in various sections of titles 2
and 42.
7 The argument for damages liability would be that the negligence rule is not a
rule of direct liability for the employer's "own" conduct, but rather an attribution rule
that determines when a nonsupervisory worker's intentional discrimination will be
attributed to the employer. An employer, then, has "engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination," 42 USC § 1981a(a)(1), whenever it has been negligent with respect to
the unlawful intentional discrimination of its employees. There is nothing wrong with
that argument as a formal matter. But one should not place much hope for a broad
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a Court that is as willing as was the
Vance Court to read the definition of supervisor narrowly to limit employer liability.
78 See 42 USC § 2000e-5(g); Suders, 542 US at 141-43.
79 See, for example, Ricci v DeStefano, 557 US 557, 577-78 (2009). Title VII's text
does create special rules, for particular forms of discrimination, that fall outside of these
two frameworks. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), for example, provides that
"women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work." 42 USC § 2000e(k). The Court has made
clear that this language must be enforced as written, and it has not tried hard to
shoehorn the language into either the disparate-treatment or the disparate-impact
category. See International Union v Johnson Controls, Inc, 499 US 187, 204-05 (1991).
Similarly, Title VII's religion provision requires an employer to "reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
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proof of what we often call discriminatory intent-that the
defendant treated the plaintiff adversely because of race or
sex.80 A disparate impact claim requires proof that some policy
or practice implemented by the employer has a substantial
adverse effect on a class of employees defined by race or sex,
though the employer can defend against such a claim by
showing that the practice is job-related and consistent with
business necessity.81  The Court has characterized
discriminatory harassment claims as a form of disparate
treatment, because the harasser targets an employee because of
her race or sex. 82 But if the harasser's intent is not attributed to
the employer through the vicarious liability doctrine, it is
difficult to see how the employer should be liable for intentional
discrimination simply on proof of negligence.
Professor Zatz argues that Title VII's protection against
harassment by individuals (like customers, contractors, and,
after Vance, coworkers) whose acts do not trigger vicarious
liability is best understood as a reasonable accommodation
requirement. 83 Professor Zatz's argument fits well with the
baseline negligence rule adopted by the Court in Vance. But it
fits poorly with Title VII's text, which expressly imposes a
reasonable accommodation requirement only in religion cases.84
A better reading of Title VII, I suggest, would be to hold the
employer responsible whenever discriminatory harassment by
anyone-supervisor, coworker, contractor, customer, or third
party-is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and
conditions of employment. An act of harassment cannot violate
Title VII unless it so alters terms and conditions of
employment,85 and I would contend that discriminatory terms
and conditions are properly attributed to the employer. But
practice" so long as there is no "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business." 42 USC § 2000e(j). As with the PDA, the Court has applied this provision
according to its text, without attempting to fit it into the disparate-treatment or the
disparate-impact category. See, for example, Trans World Airlines, Inc v Hardison, 432
US 63, 71-76 (1977).
80 See Ricci, 557 US at 577.
81 See id at 577-78.
82 See Oncale, 523 US at 78-81.
" See generally Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers,
Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 Colum L Rev
1357, 1386-1406 (2009).
84 See 42 USC § 2000e(j).
8' See Harris u Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 21 (1993); Meritor, 477 US at 67.
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whether or not one agrees with that argument, the important
point for my purposes is that the Court did not engage with-or
even acknowledge-these complexities.
In the end, Vance's adoption of a negligence rule for
coworker harassment, combined with the case's narrow
definition of who constitutes a supervisor, seems to be driven by
an unstated sense that discriminatory harassment is typically a
deviant act. At least presumptively, the Court seems to believe,
employees who harass other employees do so for their own
individual purposes-purposes that are not shared by, and
cannot be attributed to, the enterprise.86 This point has been a
theme of the Court's opinions since Faragher and Ellerth.
Declaring a "general rule" that "sexual harassment by a
supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment,"
Ellerth stated that "[t]he harassing supervisor often acts for
personal motives, motives unrelated and even antithetical to the
objectives of the employer."87  Faragher, with more
handwringing, said much the same thing.88 The Court's recent
decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v Dukes89 also paints
discrimination by lower-level supervisors as deviant and not
attributable to the employer.90
But there is good reason to doubt that discriminatory
harassment is really so deviant. As Professor Schultz and others
have shown, sexual harassment-like racial harassment-often
seeks to defend and reinforce preexisting workplace hierarchies
and norms.91 If discriminatory harassment persists in a
81 For a discussion of how widespread this understanding of harassment is in the
courts and elsewhere, see Lawton, 13 Geo Mason L Rev at 821 (cited in note 70) (arguing
that current liability standards for workplace harassment are improperly "based on the
assumption that the organizational employer plays no role in creating the hostile work
environment").
87 Ellerth, 524 US at 757.
See Faragher, 524 US at 793-801.
89 131 S Ct 2541 (2011).
90 See id at 2554 (citation omitted):
To the contrary, left to their own devices most managers in any corporation-
and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination-
would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion
that produce no actionable disparity at all. Others may choose to reward
various attributes that produce disparate impact-such as scores on general
aptitude tests or educational achievements. And still other managers may be
guilty of intentional discrimination that produces a sex-based disparity.
91 See note 70.
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workplace to the extent that it is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the terms and conditions of employment, one can
reasonably conclude that it serves the employer's own perceived
interests. Otherwise, the employer would not tolerate its
continuation.
In any event, the Vance Court left all of these policy
judgments implicit. In concluding that employers could be liable
for coworker harassment only if the employers were themselves
negligent, the Court failed to confront any of these questions. Its
decision thus rests on unacknowledged, undefended, and quite
dubious policy judgments.
II. THE FALSE DETERMINACY CRITIQUE
To the extent that the Vance Court offered a rationale for
choosing the definition of supervisor it picked, that rationale had
nothing to do with the statutory policies identified in Faragher
and Ellerth: prevention of harassment, protection against
retaliation, and encouraging the mitigation of damages. Rather,
it rested on the supposed ease of application of the Court's
preferred definition. The definition of supervisor proposed by the
plaintiff and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), by contrast, was one that the Court believed was not
easy to apply.
The Court made these points so often that workability is
easily the dominant theme of the Court's opinion. Thus, the
Court argued that the EEOC's definition "would make the
determination of supervisor status depend on a highly case-
specific evaluation of numerous factors."92 It dismissed the
EEOC's definition as "nebulous,"93 "abstract," 4 "ill-defined,"95
and "a study in ambiguity"96-indeed, not just ordinary
ambiguity but "remarkable ambiguity."97 The Court also said
that "[t]he Seventh Circuit's understanding of the concept of a
'supervisor,' with which we agree, is easily workable," while the
"alternative, in many cases, would frustrate judges and
92 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2443.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2449.
97 Id at 2450.
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confound jurors."9 8 The Court expanded on the point later in the
opinion:
The interpretation of the concept of a supervisor that
we adopt today is one that can be readily applied. In a
great many cases, it will be known even before litigation
is commenced whether an alleged harasser was a
supervisor, and in others, the alleged harasser's status
will become clear to both sides after discovery. And once
this is known, the parties will be in a position to assess
the strength of a case and to explore the possibility of
resolving the dispute. Where this does not occur,
supervisor status will generally be capable of resolution
at summary judgment. 9
The ability to resolve the question of supervisor status before
trial, the Court explained, was a crucial advantage of the
definition it adopted. 100
There are two essential problems with the Court's analysis
on this point. First, the Court far overstated the determinacy of
its definition of supervisor-and the ability of that definition to
avoid difficult jury questions. The Court spoke of the "authority
to inflict direct economic injury" as if that "authority" was a
unitary thing that either exists or does not. 101 Indeed, it insisted
that "those possessing the authority to effect a tangible change
in a victim's terms or conditions of employment" 102 made up "a
98 Id at 2444.
99 Id at 2449.
1oo See Vance, 133 S Ct at 2450:
Under the definition of "supervisor" that we adopt today, the question of
supervisor status, when contested, can very often be resolved as a matter of
law before trial. The elimination of this issue from the trial will focus the
efforts of the parties, who will be able to present their cases in a way that
conforms to the framework that the jury will apply. The plaintiff will know
whether he or she must prove that the employer was negligent or whether the
employer will have the burden of proving the elements of the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense. Perhaps even more important, the work of the jury, which
is inevitably complicated in employment discrimination cases, will be
simplified. The jurors can be given preliminary instructions that allow them to
understand, as the evidence comes in, how each item of proof fits into the
framework that they will ultimately be required to apply.
101 Id at 2448.
102 Id.
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unitary category of supervisors." 103 But a shrinking proportion of
employers adopt a hierarchical model of supervision in which
the hiring and firing authority resides in a single "unitary"
person or category. 104 As Professor Sperino notes, "[i]n many
instances, one individual is not responsible for employment
decisions," but "multiple individuals" instead "act either
independently or as a group to make a final decision."105 In such
circumstances, the person who has the titular authority to make
the tangible employment action will often rely to a large extent
on the evaluations, recommendations, or actions of other
employees. In workplaces like these, courts have found it quite
difficult to determine who counts as the decisionmaker for Title
VII purposes.106 Even the Supreme Court's own effort to address
the issue in Staub v Proctor Hospital107 "left a number of
unanswered questions" regarding the scope of employer liability
in circumstances where multiple employees contribute to an
ultimate employment decision. 108
The Court recognized this problem, but its response fatally
undermined the claim that its supervisor definition was
workable and readily applied at summary judgment. The Court
explained that if an employer "confine[s] decisionmaking power
to a small number of individuals, those individuals will have a
limited ability to exercise independent discretion" when
undertaking a tangible employment action; they will thus "likely
rely on other workers who actually interact with the affected
employee."109 "Under those circumstances," the Court allowed,
"the employer may be held to have effectively delegated the
'0 Id at 2443.
104 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Cal L Rev 1, 10-11 (2006). For a good general discussion of
changing workplace dynamics, see Katherine V.W. Stone, From Widgets to Digits:
Employment Regulation for the Changing Workplace 67-116 (Cambridge 2004).
'0 Sandra F. Sperino, A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate Liability for Title VII, 61
Ala L Rev 773, 788-89 (2010).
106 See Steven F. Befort and Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat's Paw:
Delineating the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination
Statutes, 60 SC L Rev 383, 389-97 (2008) (discussing the competing standards
established by the circuit courts of appeals).
107 131 S Ct 1186 (2011).
10 See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 BU L Rev
1431, 1448 (2012). See also Theresa M. Beiner, Subordinate Bias Liability, 35 U Ark
Little Rock L Rev 89, 105-07 (2012) (detailing these unanswered questions).
109 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2452.
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power to take tangible employment actions to the employees on
whose recommendations it relies."110
This "effectively delegated" standard is every bit as
"nebulous," "abstract," and "ill-defined" -and "depend[ent] on a
highly case-specific evaluation of numerous factors"-as was the
definition of supervisor that the Vance Court rejected. But when
Justice Ginsburg's dissent suggested that the Court's rule was
itself ambiguous,111 the Court responded with simply an
authoritative -sounding epithetic assertion ("it is indisputable
that our holding is orders of magnitude clearer than the
nebulous standard [the dissent] would adopt") combined with a
wave of the hand ("[e]mployment discrimination cases present
an almost unlimited number of factual variations, and marginal
cases are inevitable under any standard"). 112 Those responses
are hardly sufficient. It is far from "indisputable" that the
"effectively delegated" standard the Court adopted is at all
easier for a judge or jury to grasp than is the "authority to direct
daily work" standard that the Court rejected. And far from being
"marginal cases," circumstances in which multiple individuals
have a role in the ultimate employment decision are extremely
common. 113 The Court's decision thus will predictably lead to
uncertainty in practice-exactly the opposite of what the Court
purported to seek.
Second, if ease of application by judges and juries is the key
interest, the Court could have served that interest much more
readily by simply adopting the same employer liability standard
for supervisory and coworker harassment. By imposing different
standards of liability depending on whether the harasser is a
supervisor or an ordinary coworker, the Court's decision
requires judges and juries first to determine how to characterize
the harasser before moving on to decide the merits of the
harassment claim. If the Court had simply held that the
employer is liable for discriminatory harassment perpetrated by
any employee, it could have avoided this extra step-and the
uncertainty and difficulties of application that it creates.
110 Id.
n. See id at 2462 (Ginsburg dissenting).
112 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2449 n 12.
ns See generally Stone, From Widgets to Digits (cited in note 104) (discussing the
lack of clear hierarchies in many modern workplaces).
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To be sure, the Court could equalize the standard for
supervisory and coworker harassment in two different ways. It
could level up (by making employers vicariously liable for the
harassment of any employee) or level down (by limiting an
employer's liability for harassment to negligence in any case).
For all the reasons set forth in the previous Part, however, a
rule of vicarious liability serves the statutory policies better
than does a negligence rule. Moreover, it is striking that the
Court, so critical of standards that "depend on a highly case-
specific evaluation of numerous factors" when rejecting the
EEOC's definition of supervisor,114 ultimately adopted a
negligence rule. In parrying the dissent's argument that its
standard would leave victims unprotected, the Vance Court itself
emphasized the numerous case-specific factors that a jury
should consider under it: "the jury should be instructed that the
nature and degree of authority wielded by the harasser is an
important factor to be considered in determining whether the
employer was negligent."115 The Court explained that "[t]he
nature and degree of authority possessed by harassing
employees varies greatly," and it argued that that the negligence
standard is well suited "to deal with the variety of situations
that will inevitably arise." 116 The Court went on to state that
"[e]vidence that an employer did not monitor the workplace,
failed to respond to complaints, failed to provide a system for
registering complaints, or effectively discouraged complaints
from being filed would be relevant" to the determination
whether the employer was negligent. 117 That's a lot of case-
specific factors for a Court that doesn't want judges and juries to
have to engage in "a highly case-specific evaluation of numerous
factors"!
If anything, I have understated the uncertainties in
applying a negligence standard of employer liability. That
standard makes an employer liable for "its own" negligence, but
what does it mean for the employer itself to be negligent? Unless
the employer is an individual, an employer cannot act on "its
own." It can act only through its agents.118 To apply a rule that
114 See Vance, 133 S Ct at 2443.
l. Id at 2451.
n1 Id.
117 See id at 2453.
11 See, for example, Fisk and Chemerinsky, 7 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 759 (cited in
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says that an employer is liable for "its own" negligence thus
requires a determination of which acts, by which agents, the law
will treat as the employer's "own" acts. But the Vance Court
offers absolutely no guidance on how to go about making this
determination. Surely the category of an employer's own acts is
not limited to official resolutions of a corporation's board or even
the acts of employees who serve in such high-level positions that
they may be understood as the alter ego of the corporation.119 If
the category were so limited, any sizeable enterprise would be
effectively immune from claims of coworker harassment,
because it would be very unlikely that the highest-level officials
of such enterprises would or should know about harassment
taking place among rank-and-file employees. Instead, the
category of the employer's own acts must extend to the acts of
some lower-level supervisory personnel. And, indeed, the
Faragher Court expressed approval of lower court decisions that
found employers liable for coworker harassment in cases where
supervisors knew about the harassment but did nothing about
it. 12 0 But is it enough that any supervisor (under the Vance
definition of supervisor) knew about and failed to stop the
harassment? Or is employer negligence liability limited to acts
and omissions by those supervisors who should know about and
take steps to stop acts of harassment? If the latter, how are we
to determine what class of supervisors should know about those
acts? Is this simply a matter for the trier of fact to decide, taking
into account all of the circumstances? The Court's strong
reliance on a negligence standard of employer liability sits
extremely uneasily with its emphatic rejection of standards that
require juries to make highly fact-specific determinations.
In short, the Vance majority promised that its formalist
approach would afford more determinacy than would alternative
note 27) ("Employer liability is a problem in any cause of action that creates liability of
an entity because the entity-defendant is not a living person and it does not act except
through the living persons who work for it.").
119 Compare Board of County Commissioners u Brown, 520 US 397, 405-06 (1997),
citing Monell v Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 US 658 (1978)
(holding that a formal decision by a city council is an act of the city itself that triggers
municipal liability under Monell), with Faragher, 524 US at 789 (describing "the
president of the corporate employer" as "indisputably within that class of an employer
organization's officials who may be treated as the organization's proxy").
120 See Faragher, 524 US at 789, citing Katz u Dole, 709 F2d 251, 256 (4th Cir 1983);
Hall v Gus Construction Co, 842 F2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir 1988).
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rules. But, as is often the case with formal rules, the promise of
determinacy was a false one.
III. THE PATH FORWARD
In her dissenting opinion in Vance, Justice Ginsburg called
on Congress "to correct the error into which this Court has
fallen, and to restore the robust protections against workplace
harassment the Court weakens today." 12 1 Justice Ginsburg has a
successful track record in such calls for Congress to overturn the
Court's restrictive civil rights decisions. 122 Given current
partisan alignments in the House and Senate, she is less likely
to be successful this time. 123 Nonetheless, Vance presents an
important opportunity to rethink the employer liability
structure the Supreme Court has created for workplace
harassment. Even if Congress is unlikely to overturn Vance in
the near term, it is important for civil rights advocates to plan
now for the moment when an opportunity arises. And Vance has,
as I argued above, exposed deep flaws in the Court's employer
liability doctrine. Congress should correct those flaws.
But it would be a shame if any effort to overturn Vance were
limited to the Court's definition of employer. As I have argued,
reliance on a distinction between supervisors and coworkers for
purposes of employer liability will itself undermine key
statutory policies. Coworker harassment frequently draws on
the implicit sanction of the employer and carries with it the
implicit threat of retaliation against those who complain.
Applying a lesser standard of employer liability to coworker
harassment thus threatens the policy, recognized in Faragher
121 Vance, 133 S Ct at 2466 (Ginsburg dissenting).
122 See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub L No 111-2, 123 Stat 5 (2009),
codified at 42 USC § 2000e-5 and various sections of Title 29. In her dissent in Ledbetter
u Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 550 US 618 (2007), Justice Ginsburg urged Congress to
take action and amend the law regarding pay discrimination. See also Lilly Ledbetter
and Lanier Scott Isom, Grace and Grit: My Fight for Equal Pay and Fairness at
Goodyear and Beyond 216 (Three Rivers 2013) (discussing how Congress "heeded Justice
Ginsburg's clarion call").
123 See generally Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It's Even Worse Than it
Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of
Extremism (Basic Books 2012) (analyzing the acrimony and hyperpartisanship that have
come to dominate Congress and render it almost completely ineffectual); Richard L.
Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86
S Cal L Rev 205, 233-42 (2013) (discussing that, as Congress has become more polarized,
fewer congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions have occurred).
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and Ellerth, of protecting employees against harassment that is
made more powerful by workplace norms that support the
harassers.
Applying different standards to coworker and supervisory
harassment also undermines the statutory policy, emphasized in
Vance itself, of clarity and ease of administration. Because the
lines of authority in modern workplaces are often so complex
and overlapping, the determination whether a harasser is
properly characterized as a supervisor or a mere coworker will
in a wide array of cases be uncertain and require extensive
litigation. As Justice Alito explained in his Vance majority
opinion, the supervisor definition pressed by the EEOC and
Justice Ginsburg was marked by just that sort of uncertainty. 124
And, as I have shown, so was the definition Justice Alito's
majority opinion itself adopted. Particularly because supervisory
status-however defined-at best only loosely correlates with
the statutory policies that justify employer liability, there is no
good reason to create the uncertainty and litigation that would
attend to making that status a trigger for liability.
It is not enough, however, simply to eliminate Vance's
distinction between supervisors and coworkers. Any
congressional effort to revisit employer liability standards under
Title VII should confront the problems that have emerged with
the FaragherlEllerth affirmative defense. There is a substantial
argument that Congress should eliminate that defense
entirely. 125 When it created the defense, the Court justified it as
serving two important policies: encouraging employers to adopt
measures that prevent, and do not merely compensate for,
discrimination; and encouraging employees to mitigate damages
by reporting, and therefore helping bring to an end,
discrimination against them. 12 6 But experience shows that the
FaragherlEllerth defense has not served these interests in
practice.
As for encouraging preventive action by employers, a rule of
strict vicarious liability should serve the policy at least as well
as the FaragherlEllerth rule of vicarious liability plus an
124 See Part II.
121 See generally Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and
Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 Colum J Gender & L 197 (2004); Harper, 36 San Diego
L Rev 41 (cited in note 27).
126 See Faragher, 524 US at 805-07.
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affirmative defense of reasonableness. A standard justification
of strict liability is that, so long as it imposes liability on the
cheapest cost avoider, it will encourage parties to take the
efficient level of precautions. 127 If an employer is forced to
internalize the costs of discriminatory harassment committed by
its employees, it will, on standard economic theory, invest in
precautions up to the point where they are no longer cost
justified. 128 And the certainty that the employer will be required
to internalize those costs sends a clearer deterrent signal than
does a negligence rule (or the FaragherlEllerth rule of strict
liability with a non-negligence defense), which subjects the
parties to the risk that a trier of fact will err in determining
what precautions are in fact cost justified. 129
Professor Rip Verkerke agrees that a rule of strict vicarious
liability makes sense in cases in which harassment is systemic
within a workplace. 130 Consistent with the analysis I have
offered above, he also would not distinguish between supervisory
and coworker conduct in triggering employer liability. 131 But he
argues that, in cases of individual harassment, liability should
turn on actual or constructive notice to the employer (because
the target of the harassment in such cases has information that
is not available to the employer without the employer's taking
127 For a classic statement of the point, see Guido Calabresi and Jon T. Hirschoff,
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L J 1055, 1060 (1972).
128 See id at 1060 (discussing that this theory "simply require[s] a decision as to
whether the injurer or the victim was in the better position both to judge whether
avoidance costs would exceed foreseeable accident costs and to act on that judgment").
129 See, for example, Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 Yale L J
656, 660-61 (1975). Calabresi notes that:
The collective decision, that avoidance by the injurer was worthwhile and that
the injurer should have known it, is now little more than the basis for
reversing the original judgment as to who could best make the cost-benefit
analysis. Fault and the loss are assigned to the injurer rather than the victim;
the analysis is now assumed to be best made by him.
Id at 660-61.
"s See J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81
Va L Rev 273 (1995).
1s1 See id at 279. In this regard, Professor Verkerke (in my view, persuasively)
rejects Alan Sykes's argument, Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An
Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101
Harv L Rev 563, 606-08 (1988), that supervisory harassment is caused by the enterprise
in a way that coworker harassment is not. See Verkerke, 81 Va L Rev at 309-10 (cited in
note 130).
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unduly costly steps to acquire it).132 One can accept Verkerke's
broad analysis while still concluding that strict vicarious
liability is the appropriate rule to impose in discriminatory
harassment cases. As Professors Schultz and Lawton have
shown, discriminatory harassment typically draws on and even
enforces a workplace culture of discrimination. 133 In other
words, discriminatory harassment is typically "systemic" in the
sense that Verkerke uses the term. Even on Verkerke's analysis,
then, strict vicarious liability is the appropriate rule to apply in
the run of cases.
Moreover, experience with the FaragherlEllerth defense
demonstrates that it has not provided employers with an
incentive to adopt effective policies to prevent, detect, and stop
harassment. Professor Joanna Grossman has shown that the
FaragherlEllerth regime "has overemphasized compliance with
prophylactic rules at the expense of effecting real change in
preventing the problem of sexual harassment in the
workplace." 134 She argues that the regime rewards employers
"for paying lip service to the regime by enacting standard-issue
policies and procedures, regardless of whether those efforts
actually reduce harassment or compensate victims." 135 This is
132 See Verkerke, 81 Va L Rev at 364-65 (cited in note 130).
lss See Schultz, 107 Yale L J 1683, 1756-61 (cited in note 70); Lawton, 13 Geo
Mason L Rev 817, 839-40 (cited in note 70).
114 Grossman, 26 Harv Women's L J at 4 (cited in note 27).
ls. Id at 3-4. See also Bagenstos, 94 Cal L Rev at 24-25 (cited in note 104), finding
that:
Under the prevailing approach [in the lower courts], employers can avoid
liability for harassment simply by adopting and distributing policies that
formally prohibit harassment and creating a grievance process that allows an
employee to file a complaint with someone other than the individual who
harassed her. This is true even absent any indication that the process set up by
the employer has been effective at that or any other workplace.
See also Lawton, 13 Colum J Gender & L at 198 (cited in note 125), finding that:
[T]he lower federal courts have interpreted the elements of the affirmative
defense so as to reward employers for engaging in behaviors that have little
effect on the incidence of workplace harassment. The courts reward employers
for developing and distributing nicely worded harassment policies and
procedures and, in some cases, providing sexual harassment training to their
employees. The empirical literature does not support the federal courts'
assumption that paper policies and procedures, even when coupled with
training, deter sexual harassment in the workplace.
For a recent empirical assessment of courts' application of the Faragher/Ellerth defense,
which concludes that the courts are not applying the defense according to the terms set
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exactly the sort of misplaced reward that a negligence rule
sometimes creates but a strict liability rule avoids. 136 If
employers were required to internalize the costs of
discriminatory harassment perpetrated by their employees, they
would have the incentive to adopt internal policies that actually
work to reduce harassment-rather than policies that simply
are likely to impress a judge or jury.
As for encouraging mitigation of damages, the
Faragher/Ellerth defense fails to provide appropriate incentives.
That is because of the interaction between the way lower courts
have applied the second prong of the defense and the rules
governing Title VII retaliation claims. As Professors Brake and
Grossman have shown, lower courts tend to conclude that
targets of harassment have "unreasonably failed to take
advantage of . . . preventive or corrective opportunities," 137 and
that their employers are therefore not liable, when they fail to
invoke their employers' internal complaint procedures within a
few days or weeks from the first harassing incident.138 As they
note, "[e]mployees who experience harassment and then wait to
see if harassing behavior continues or to gather more evidence
before complaining are often deemed unreasonable" by the
courts. 139 But employees who complain at the first significant
incident of harassment may find themselves unprotected against
retaliation. Title VII's "opposition clause" prohibits employers
from retaliating against workers who complain about
discrimination, but only if the workers "reasonably believe" that
the discrimination that they report violates the statute. 140
forth by the Supreme Court (but is sympathetic to the courts for acting as they do), see
generally Zev J. Eigen, Nicholas F. Menillo, and David S. Sherwyn, When Rules are
Made to Be Broken (Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No 13-04, Feb 26, 2013),
online at http: //papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=2225978 (visited Oct 18,
2014).
1s6 See Lawton, 13 Geo Mason L Rev 817, 841-46 (cited in note 70) (discussing the
distorted incentive system).
1s7 Faragher, 524 US at 807.
"s See Brake and Grossman, 86 NC L Rev at 879-84 (cited in note 51).
19 Id at 881.
140 See Clark County School District u Breeden, 532 US 268, 270-71 (2001) (holding
that the plaintiff's retaliation claim failed because "[n]o reasonable person could have
believed that the single incident recounted [] violated Title VII's standard."). See also
Crawford v Metropolitan Government of Nashuille and Davidson County, Tennessee, 555
US 271 (2009) (unanimously holding that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII
extends to people who speak out, not just on their own initiative, but when prompted by
an employer's internal investigation).
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Professors Brake and Grossman describe a "plethora of court
decisions" that have found "employees' beliefs that they were
opposing unlawful harassment to be unreasonable because they
complained of harassment too soon, before enough incidents had
occurred to create a hostile environment." 14 1
The intersection of these two doctrines places the targets of
harassment on the horns of a dilemma. They must "promptly
report acts of harassment through employer channels in order to
preserve their right to later challenge the harassment under
Title VII," but at the same time they "risk lawful retaliation by
employers if they complain too soon, before the offending
conduct comes close enough to an actionable hostile
environment." 142 However employees respond to this dilemma, it
should be clear that the FaragherlEllerth defense is not
appropriately encouraging the targets of harassment to mitigate
damages. Rather than relieving the employer of liability if the
target of harassment failed to complain in what a judge or jury
later determines was a sufficiently prompt fashion, the better
way to encourage mitigation of damages is to have a strong,
clear, and effective protection against retaliation. Harassment is
an unpleasant thing to experience-e specially harassment that
is "severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment." 14 3 Its targets have ample incentive
to take steps to end the abusive conduct even without a rule that
limits their recovery if they fail to complain. What stops many
workers from complaining is the understanding that if they
complain they may lose their jobs. 144
When Congress takes up Justice Ginsburg's invitation in
Vance, then, it should not limit itself to the narrow issue that
was before the Court in that case. Instead, it should adopt a rule
of strict vicarious employer liability for any unlawful
harassment perpetrated by any employee, and it should
141 Brake and Grossman, 86 NC L Rev at 923-24 (cited in note 51).
142 Id at 924 (emphasis in original). Problems like these have led some scholars to
advocate eliminating the "reasonable belief' requirement. See generally Brianne J.
Gorod, Rejecting "Reasonableness": A New Look at Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision,
56 Am U L Rev 1469 (2007); Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not To Report: The
Case for Eliminating the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities
Under Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39 Ariz St L J 1127 (2007).
143 Harris, 510 US at 21.
144 See, for example, Brake and Grossman, 86 NC L Rev 859, 927 (cited in note 51)
("Plaintiff complained to a store manager about the incident, and in her retaliation
claim, alleged that she was fired as a result.").
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abandon the FaragherlEllerth affirmative defense. That defense
was based on a set of expectations-about how employers and
employees would react to it, and about how lower courts would
apply it-that have not held true in practice. A rule of strict
vicarious liability, perhaps bolstered by a beefed-up
antiretaliation regime, is likely to serve the policies identified by
the FaragherlEllerth Court better than the affirmative defense
the Court created in those cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Vance exemplifies two of
the key critiques of formalism in law. But, more important for
the future, it presents an opportunity-an opportunity to
rethink the entire approach to employer liability in workplace
harassment cases that the Court adopted in Faragher and
Ellerth. That approach has failed to serve the Title VII policies
that the Court itself identified in those cases. It has not
protected the targets of harassment against retaliation, it has
not encouraged employers to adopt effective policies to prevent
and address harassment, and it has not been necessary to
encourage mitigation of damages. Congress should take up
Justice Ginsburg's call to overturn Vance, but it should not stop
there. Congress should adopt a general rule that employers are
liable for any discriminatory harassment in their workplaces
that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter terms and
conditions of employment. Such a rule best accommodates the
Title VII policies that the Court itself sought to implement in
Faragher and Ellerth. Unfortunately, the FaragherlEllerth
doctrine has failed to meet its promise to serve those policies.
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